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Chairman: Mr. PONCE (Ecuador)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. PENNANEACH (Togo) said that the work of the Committee in 1993 was taking place against a background of positive changes in the world. They included inter alia the signing by the United States and the Russian Federation in January 1993 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) which provided for a significant reduction in strategic weapons. The accession of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also deserved mention, for it might serve as an example to other States which had signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992.

2. However, despite those positive developments mankind would not rid itself of the threat of nuclear war as long as nuclear weapons existed and their regular testing to achieve even greater sophistication continued. In that connection China's resumption of nuclear tests was a source of concern. The total cessation of nuclear tests was an essential precondition of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Togo delegation welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

3. The dumping and disposal underground of nuclear, toxic and hazardous wastes was also a source of deep concern. In accordance with the 1992 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, the Togo delegation called for an end to such practices, which represented a serious threat to the security of States.

4. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world was extremely important and helped to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Togo once again appealed to the international community to respect the spirit and letter of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. In that connection the efforts currently being made by the Group of Experts to Examine the Modalities and Elements for the Preparation and Implementation of a Convention or Treaty on the Denuclearization of Africa deserved special mention. The Togo delegation proposed that the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament Affairs should continue to support those efforts with a view to the speedy conclusion of a treaty.

5. Transparency in armaments was the best means of building confidence among States at the subregional, regional and international levels. In that regard the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms deserved commendation.

6. The increase in illegal trafficking in conventional weapons and their excessive accumulation, together with the continuing conflicts in several regions of the world, called for appropriate decisions and action to ensure effective regional disarmament which was a precondition for general and complete disarmament. In order to attain that goal the activities and role of the United Nations regional peace and disarmament centres would have to be strengthened. It was extremely important to extend the scope of the regional centres so that, in conjunction with the United Nations itself, they could make a bigger

(Mr. Pennaneach, Togo)

contribution to the prevention and settlement of local and regional conflicts and to the establishment and maintenance of peace.

7. Accordingly, the Government of Togo, despite its economic and financial difficulties, had undertaken to pay its arrears of contributions to the financing of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the headquarters of which was located in Lomé. In addition to paying its arrears, the Government of Togo was making a new building available to the Centre for use as the residence of its Director. However, despite the efforts made by the Government of Togo to reactivate the Lomé Centre, it remained paralysed by the failure to appoint a Director and the shortage of material, financial and human resources. The Government of Togo was grateful to Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany) for their significant contribution to the operation of the Lomé Centre. Togo appealed to all African States and to other Member States to do everything possible to support the activities of the regional centres, for they were effective means of establishing and maintaining regional peace and security.

8. Peace was not only the absence of war. Peace and security meant primarily the material and social welfare of mankind. At present the peace and security of States were threatened not so much by armed conflicts as by other factors. The world-wide economic crisis, the calamitous situation of peoples, the destruction of the social fabric of society, starvation, disease, unemployment, and poverty in the developing countries were equally serious threats to the peace and security of States and peoples. In the study of ways and means to establish peace and security primary attention should be given to the quest for means of satisfying fundamental human needs. The United Nations and the international community had a leading role to play in that undertaking.

9. Mr. BATU (Turkey) said that the dramatic changes on the international scene over the last four years had put an end to ideological rivalries and certain traditional patterns of confrontation. At the same time the adverse consequences of the instability which might arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes and resurgent nationalism, and the build-up of military power and proliferation of weapon technologies, including weapons of mass destruction, had emerged as new sources of tension, crisis and armed conflict. The international community must adapt itself to the new environment and seek new approaches.

10. The strengthening of stability and security in Europe was one of the major priorities of Turkish foreign policy. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which established a stable and secure balance at lower levels of conventional armed forces, and the agreement known as CFE 1A relating to the limitation of military personnel were a major component of European security. Attempts to change the provisions of those instruments would jeopardize security and confidence in Europe and prompt a resumption of the build-up of conventional arms. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had an important role to play in that regard. The establishment in 1992 of a CSCE forum for security and cooperation had given a new impetus to the efforts to enhance consultation and cooperation among participating States on matters relating to security and reduction of the risk of conflict.

(Mr. Batu, Turkey)

11. Because of its geographical location Turkey enjoyed special relations with the most diverse regions of Europe and Asia and was following with interest the formation of regional mechanisms to guarantee international peace and security. In that context it supported the initiative of Kazakhstan for the convening of a conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia as a complement to the CSCE process. The establishment of appropriate regional or subregional arrangements would contribute to the security of the countries concerned and help them to reach their goals of economic development in a stable and secure environment.

12. The Middle East was another region of particular importance for Turkey. The Israeli-Palestinian accords had created historic opportunities for establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East. Arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures remained an indispensable part of that process. Such confidence- and security-building measures as the exchange of information and prior notification of military activities, which would take into account the interests of all participating States, could serve in the initial stages as an indication of a serious intention to participate in the arms control process, and at a later stage could become fundamental elements of the verification of an arms control and regional security regime.

13. Clandestine transfers of conventional arms, as well as military equipment and technology constituted a serious problem. Such transfers were carried out for lucrative purposes and had a direct bearing on international peace and security, particularly in regions where tensions still existed. In that connection he attached great importance to the work of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in drafting principles governing conventional arms transfers as well as the CSCE code of conduct. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a further means of building confidence at the regional and international levels.

14. During the cold war, nuclear disarmament had been one of the rare issues on which the two super-Powers had been able to conclude very important agreements on nuclear arms control. The end of the cold war had opened up new opportunities. The signing of the START-II Treaty by the United States of American and the Russian Federation was a step in the right direction. However, since the START-II Treaty could not be implemented until the entry into force of the START-I Treaty, it was vital that the parties concerned should ratify the latter in conformity with the Lisbon Protocol. Turkey also welcomed the statements by France, the Russian Federation and the United States indicating that they would call a halt to their nuclear tests and the confirmation by the United Kingdom that it would refrain from nuclear testing during the United States moratorium. However, it was regrettable that China had not joined those countries but instead had decided to carry out an underground nuclear test.

15. Turkey had always regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as one of the most important multilateral agreements on disarmament. On many occasions it had called upon the nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the Treaty to adhere strictly to its provisions. However, recent developments had pointed up a number of weaknesses in the Treaty, especially with regard to safeguards and verification. The verification regime of the Treaty should be strengthened, particularly as

(Mr. Batu, Turkey)

far as the discovery of undeclared nuclear installations was concerned. Further improvement of the nuclear safeguards could be achieved without amending the current wording of the Treaty through the adoption of an additional protocol. In view of the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, there was good reason to believe that the international community had sufficient technical know-how and experience to develop an efficient international verification system, which would bring an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

16. As the only multilateral negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament could make a substantial contribution to securing peace and security, provided that it was able to perform a number of pressing tasks, especially those in connection with the comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was perfectly clear that the radical changes taking place in the world should convince members of the Conference that the time had come to brush aside the illusory prestige of belonging to an exclusive club by extending the membership of the Conference and sharing the burden of financing its activities.

17. Mr. CARDENAS (Argentina) said that his Government's foreign policy had consistently been aimed at supporting the United Nations system of collective security and the activities of the Security Council, which constituted the main guarantee for international peace and security. The United Nations system of collective security could be supplemented by security measures and agreements adopted by the regional organizations. Argentina was particularly interested in the new concept of cooperative security, whose purpose was to establish confidence-building mechanisms that would ensure the predictability of action by any party, thereby reducing the possibility of confrontation and enhancing the prospects for cooperation.

18. In recent years great strides had been made in the field of disarmament. The START-II Treaty, the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe and the Chemical Weapons Convention were ample proof of the steady progress made in the area. Yet, despite the positive trend, conflicts in different regions of the world continued to pose a threat to global peace and security. It was essential that international commitments freely entered into should be fully honoured without any political conditions being imposed. The inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also of vital importance in ensuring adequate transparency in nuclear programmes. Argentina attached great importance to the United States proposal calling for negotiations to ban the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

19. With regard to the prohibition of the other category of weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons, while Argentina welcomed the fact that a large number of countries had adhered to the Chemical Weapons Convention, it wished to stress the importance of universal adherence to the instrument.

20. Argentina firmly supported the drafting by the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The conclusion of the treaty would be a key element in activities geared to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Cardenas, Argentina)

21. Together with other Latin American countries, Argentina was doing its utmost to ensure that transparency in military matters became a general principle in the activities of all countries in the region. In that connection, it endorsed the proposal for the convening of a meeting of government experts, under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), during which confidence-building measures would be examined.

22. Argentina was convinced of the value of confidence-building measures in arms control and disarmament and considered that such measures constituted the cornerstone of stability and security in outer space. The delegation of Argentina would be submitting a draft resolution on the study annexed to document A/48/305, which had been prepared by the group of governmental experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990.

23. As to the organization of the First Committee's work, Argentina shared the view expressed by many delegations regarding the need to reform the Committee's agenda. It also considered that the document circulated by the States members of the European Economic Community (EEC) contained a number of suggestions which might help to make the Committee more efficient.

24. Ms. MAIR (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the 12 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that, in the modern, increasingly interdependent, world, the lack of stability in many regions and its root causes required joint efforts by the international community, acting through the United Nations and in accordance with the principles enshrined in its Charter. Regarding security concerns in the Caribbean in the 1990s, she said that over the years the region had witnessed different conflicts. The national security of several members of the Caribbean Community had been threatened by internal civil strife, attempted coups d'état, subversive activity, threats of intervention, criminal activity and territorial disputes.

25. The CARICOM countries were small, mainly island, developing States, and as such, were highly vulnerable to outside influences of a political, economic, social and cultural nature. The illegal trade in narcotics accordingly posed a serious security risk for the Caribbean. The problem had grave implication for the stability of the countries in the region and was a potential challenge to national sovereignty and security. Another threat to security in the Caribbean was the situation in Haiti, where anti-democratic forces were violently resisting a peaceful process of democratic change.

26. The countries of the Caribbean had consistently recognized the need for collective action to address their security concerns. Since cooperation in that area should be strengthened and expanded, they were actively considering the feasibility of establishing a CARICOM security regime, complementing efforts already undertaken in the regional security system. In that connection, the members of CARICOM wished to indicate their support for the project on the security of small States to be undertaken in 1994 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

27. As small States, the members of CARICOM relied on the protection of the United Nations when their security was seriously threatened. They therefore had a vested interest in the effective functioning of the Organization's collective

(Ms. Mair, Jamaica)

security system and intended to contribute to deliberations on the reform of the Security Council.

28. Security was a multifaceted concept. Many problems threatening national and regional security were rooted in social and economic factors. For that reason, the countries of the Caribbean firmly believed that "An Agenda for Peace" must be complemented by a comprehensive agenda for development.

29. The end of the cold war had brought hopes of a peace dividend, which would be applied to development. The members of CARICOM hoped that, given the political will, a reduction in arms spending would release funds for the development of their national economies.

30. The Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization recorded the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, designed to ensure greater transparency in armaments. The members of CARICOM hoped that the Register's scope would be expanded to include other categories of arms.

31. Despite the end of the cold war, the need for nuclear disarmament remained of paramount importance. The members of CARICOM welcomed the initiatives taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their nuclear arsenals but remained concerned about the continued possession of nuclear weapons by other States and the proliferation of those weapons.

32. The members of CARICOM were particularly pleased that the Conference on Disarmament had mandated its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). They hoped that, if the political will was forthcoming, a CTBT would be concluded and would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, they welcomed the decision by the President of the United States to extend the moratorium on testing to September 1994. They hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would refrain from nuclear testing and would not jeopardize the moratorium or the CTBT negotiations.

33. As parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the members of CARICOM fully supported the position taken by the Non-Aligned Movement with regard to the 1995 Conference to review and extend the NPT.

34. The members of CARICOM commended the work of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and acknowledged the need for them to become more involved in the valuable work of the Centre in pursuit of their regional objectives.

35. Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan) said that the world had changed dramatically in recent years, yet in many respects it had remained the same. The end of the cold war had removed the ideological factor as a source of conflict but ideological rivalry was only one of the causes of strife and insecurity. Such factors as the drive for power, policies of domination and hegemony, the suppression of the rights of peoples and ethnic clashes and conflicts persisted and must be contained.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

36. A specific programme was needed for global nuclear disarmament, and it should include the unwavering implementation of the START-I and START-II Treaties. In addition, efforts must be made to promote the opening of negotiations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the Conference on Disarmament. Those negotiations would furnish tangible evidence of the commitment of all States to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Until the objective of global nuclear disarmament had been reached, non-nuclear-weapon States must be provided with guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan hoped that specific moves would be taken in that direction in the near future.

37. Pakistan welcomed a number of non-proliferation measures, in particular the mandate granted to the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). Pakistan would actively participate in those negotiations. In its view, a CTBT would be an essential step towards nuclear disarmament. It also supported a global ban on the production of fissionable material, which should be realized on a non-discriminatory basis.

38. Pakistan would support the resolution on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The extension of the NPT would not, however, be sufficient in itself to ensure non-proliferation. Pakistan welcomed the progress achieved in Latin America, Africa and the South Pacific towards establishing non-proliferation regimes, but remained concerned about proliferation threats in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. In all those areas, regional non-proliferation arrangements should be set in place.

39. South Asia was currently at a critical juncture. One of the States in the region was in a position to deploy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A nuclear arms race should not be allowed to begin in the South Asian region. Pakistan's commitment to non-proliferation was clear. It had advanced several proposals for non-proliferation on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis, including the simultaneous signature of the NPT, the simultaneous acceptance of all safeguards, the mutual verification of nuclear facilities, a bilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty and a bilateral declaration of adherence to non-proliferation. Those proposals had still to receive a positive response. Pakistan had also proposed that non-proliferation measures should be discussed at a conference bringing India and Pakistan together with the United States, the Russian Federation and China. Such arrangements would be an effective means of addressing non-proliferation issues in the region.

40. At the current time, the arms race in various parts of the world was fuelled not by global disputes but by regional differences. For that reason, conventional arms control measures must be pursued at the regional and subregional levels and be guided by the following considerations: first, the practice of evaluating defence expenditures in gross national product (GNP) terms should be abandoned; second, the argument that a larger country should maintain a larger army was completely unfounded; third, the concept of "defensive sufficiency" should be transformed into practical policy designed to meet the actual threats posed to each State in various regions of the world; fourth, greater transparency in armaments could undoubtedly help curb the arms race; and fifth, the caveats invariably attached to current regional arms control proposals, for example, that the arrangements must originate with the

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

agreement of all parties concerned, were evidence of a built-in bias against the concept of regional arms control.

41. In Pakistan's opinion, proposals for regional arms control should be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament. It was necessary to formulate principles for the conduct of negotiations on regional arms control, which might include the following points: agreements should strengthen regional peace and security; States with larger military capabilities had a special responsibility in promoting such agreements; none of the parties should be capable of prevailing in a surprise attack; there should be parity in the quantitative and qualitative defence capabilities of all the parties; no significant disproportion should exist in any weapons category, and if one side possessed an offensive capability, the other side should have the right to require an equivalent capability or a defensive capability to neutralize that offensive capability.

42. Mr. BEHROUZ MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), noting the positive changes which had taken place in the course of the year, said that problems connected with the legacy of the past as well as numerous ethnic and other local conflicts nevertheless continued to challenge the common effort to establish a new world order. Although the cold war was over, it remained necessary to reorient the habits of mind on which it had been based, to develop the concept of peace and to re-examine the machinery for the regulation of disarmament, as the agreements reached in that field had been the result of negotiations carried out during the cold war period and had been intended essentially to halt the arms race in a bipolar world and to diminish the danger of war between the antagonistic blocs. Although they were effective in promoting the new collective security system they provided no machinery for the resolution of local conflicts.

43. The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be the highest priority of the international community, especially the nuclear weapon States. In that connection, Iran welcomed the moratorium on nuclear testing as well as the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its ad hoc committee a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty.

44. His delegation considered it imperative that, pending the realization of the goal of disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon States should guarantee clearly that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. There was an urgent need for a multilateral agreement on negative security guarantees, as progress on that issue would contribute to the successful outcome of the Review Conference and the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

45. Iran, as a victim of chemical weapons, had contributed to the negotiation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and firmly believed that the effectiveness and universality of that Convention would depend to a large extent on how it was implemented and the degree to which countries complied with their obligations. The Preparatory Commission should seek adequate solutions to the remaining problems and prepare the necessary conditions for its effective implementation. With regard to the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), he said that because of the lack of an effective mechanism in areas such as the transfer of material and technology for peaceful purposes, nuclear disarmament, including a

(Mr. Behrouz Moradi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

comprehensive test ban and negative security assurances, had not yet been realized. Therefore, his delegation firmly believed that any decision on an extension of the NPT could only be made in the light of its review and reassessment.

46. The establishment of zones of peace and zones free from nuclear weapons strengthened the non-proliferation regime and therefore international peace and security. Iran welcomed the progress made towards consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the steps taken to implement the Declaration of Africa as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the consideration of new alternative approaches by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. With respect to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Iran's initiative of 1974, the most important elements for the establishment of such a zone would be the practical establishment of regional confidence-building measures, including the extension of the safeguard mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all facilities and installations, and accession by all regional States to all international disarmament instruments, particularly the NPT and the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

47. The reckless build-up of conventional weapons had not only devoured much-needed resources but reinforced the atmosphere of mistrust and anxiety. The decision of the General Assembly to establish a Register of Conventional Arms constituted a positive first step for the resolution of that problem. To become effective, the Register should expand to include all categories and types of arms. However, it was evident that transparency in armaments could not by itself control the accumulation of conventional arms in various regions. What was really needed, globally and particularly in the Middle East, was international cooperation for the comprehensive, non-selective, non-discriminatory, balanced and effective reduction of conventional weapons, which could be realized through reduction of military budgets and weapons procurement and the withdrawal of foreign forces from various regions.

48. Efforts aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons on Earth should not distract the international community's attention from the arms race in and the military uses of space. Iran believed that States with advanced space technology had the primary responsibility for the discontinuance of all weapons-related activities affecting the peaceful uses of outer space. The time had come for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a view to reinforcing the existing legal regime.

49. His delegation welcomed the Committee's decision to further rationalize its work and hoped that that process would not lead to decreasing its role in disarmament or reorient its focus towards security issues not closely related to disarmament.

50. Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) said that the favourable international situation and the speeding-up of the process of disarmament in recent years had opened new prospects for progress on a whole range of issues. That was borne out by the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate to work out a comprehensive, universally applicable and internationally verifiable nuclear-test ban. If it was to halt the qualitative improvement of nuclear arms and prevent the proliferation of such arms and of the relevant dual-use technologies, it was necessary for such a treaty to be universal in character and applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States alike. To be effective and credible as a non-proliferation measure, the treaty must be of indefinite duration. A comprehensive test-ban treaty must be negotiated in a multilateral process, with due account taken of the responsibilities, concerns and technological expertise of the five nuclear Powers. In that connection, Poland welcomed the declared readiness of the United States to pursue steps for the establishment of international controls over materials for the production of nuclear weapons.

51. As to the question of international verification, in 1993 the Conference on Disarmament had made a detailed study of a number of complex issues of verification and the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which had met under its auspices had carried out an in-depth analysis of seismic and non-seismic verification techniques. Poland was attracted to the idea of the IAEA being given a role in the operation of a future CTBT verification mechanism. That and other questions in the area of verification needed to be further addressed in the actual negotiating process in 1994.

52. Poland attached great importance to the issue of transparency in armaments. Openness and transparency in the military area were a prerequisite for achieving a high level of confidence. The numerous practical proposals made in that respect deserved careful consideration. They ranged from possible guidelines which would serve as an international "code of conduct" in order to help control arms transfers to suggestions regarding an international exchange of military data on subjects not yet covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. His delegation could not subscribe to an interpretation of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L as setting clear boundaries on the time-frame and scope of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

53. On the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Ad Hoc Committee had achieved important results in its work and had contributed to the formation of clear-cut positions on the part of members of the Conference on Disarmament with regard to negotiations either on a comprehensive accord concerning outer space or on alternative, interim solutions. Poland fully shared the view that a balanced, step-by-step approach to the question was needed.

54. On the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, he noted that there had been a broad-ranging and frank debate in the Ad Hoc Committee which had resulted in a better appreciation of the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Poland believed that in that field the Ad Hoc Committee had achieved an important result in laying a solid foundation for productive and result-oriented work at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament and in subsequent years.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

55. With regard to the question of increasing the efficiency and expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, he commended the efforts that had been made to bring more order to the work of the Conference and make it a mechanism that was more responsive both to the expectations of the international community and to the challenges of the day. Poland hoped that efforts would be made to resolve the existing difficulties before the Conference on Disarmament resumed its session in January 1994.

56. Mr. ABIBI (Congo) said that the Committee was beginning its work in a favourable international situation. Confrontation was increasingly giving way to the search for dialogue and cooperation. The Congo believed that the international community should make concerted efforts to ensure the final triumph of peace and security.

57. His delegation welcomed the signing on 13 January 1993 in Paris of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was an important landmark on the long road towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

58. He expressed concern about the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Congo welcomed with interest any initiatives aimed at banning weapons of that type. In that connection, the Congo welcomed the signing of START-II by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in January 1993, and also the accession of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It hoped that that example would be followed by all nuclear-weapon States.

59. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Congo also welcomed the decisions to suspend nuclear testing taken by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France, and called upon all nuclear Powers to join in that moratorium. The process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones was also commendable. The Congo welcomed the results achieved in Latin America and in Africa. His delegation also welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

60. His delegation believed that peace and security were linked not only with development, but also with confidence-building and friendly relations among peoples. On that basis, the Congo and 10 other States of the subregion were implementing the programme of action of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. That Committee had held two meetings at the ministerial level in Bujumbura, Burundi, from 8 to 12 March 1993, and in Libreville, Gabon, from 30 August to 3 September 1993, which had achieved positive results, namely: a draft non-aggression pact which would soon be offered for signature by the heads of State and Government of the countries of the subregion; research on the question of restructuring armed forces and conversion; a decision to provide information on arms transfers to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and the establishment of a permanent intergovernmental committee for crisis management. The Congo hoped that, as in the previous year, the draft resolution on that question which would be

(Mr. Abibi, Congo)

submitted by States of the subregion would be supported by the international community, since that would enable the Standing Advisory Committee to achieve its noble goals.

61. It was widely recognized that the economic difficulties faced by developing countries were one of the sources of regional conflict. The Congo believed that the alleviation of those difficulties, along with disarmament measures, would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security. Moreover, his delegation was in favour of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament to reflect the new political and economic realities.

62. Mr. ALBESBAS (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that there had recently been positive changes in the world, some of which were associated with the end of the cold war, and important initiatives had been taken in the area of disarmament. All States Members of the United Nations must try to make use of the opportunities that were available to create an atmosphere of peace, security and tranquillity. However, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was concerned about new factors that had recently appeared, which could lead to a re-emergence of ethnic and religious conflicts.

63. It was recognized that the presence of weapons of mass destruction was not a guarantee of peace. Indeed, the arms race, especially in the field of weapons of mass destruction, was a reflection of the concern of many States about problems of security. The time had come to make an in-depth study of those phenomena and to determine the real reasons that were hindering the efforts of the international community to achieve progress in that area.

64. One of the regions in which security problems had not yet been resolved was the Middle East. His delegation believed that the imbalance in levels of armaments among the States of the region was a serious obstacle to the efforts of the United Nations to ensure peace and security in that region. Members of the Committee had frequently expressed the view that in order to establish genuine peace in the Middle East, all types of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, must be completely eliminated. So far the international community had not been able to ensure the implementation of United Nations resolutions relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The reasons for that were well known. Israel was still refusing to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to cooperate with IAEA.

65. A further factor for strengthening trust and security among States would be a commitment by the nuclear Powers not only to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to the goal of their complete destruction. The nuclear Powers had not yet shown the necessary determination to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and his delegation hoped that they would change their position, since they had the primary responsibility for the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. Any viable initiative which could promote the process of the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction could decisively change the peace and security situation on the planet.

(Mr. Albesbas, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

66. Positive changes had taken place in the world recently in the area of disarmament. Most States had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the number of operating military bases had been reduced, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction had been concluded. In its statement at the plenary session, his delegation had explained why the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had not yet been able to accede to that Convention. Convincing evidence had been adduced to show that in the region in which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was situated there were weapons of mass destruction which were not subject to international inspection. The question of accession could be seen only in connection with the problem of all types of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya believed that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an important step towards the complete elimination of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. It welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations for the conclusion of such a treaty.

67. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya believed that in the post-cold-war era, the very concept of non-proliferation was obsolete. It was now necessary to formulate another concept which would correspond more closely to the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples. That was the concept of the complete elimination of all nuclear arsenals existing in the world. Even though a considerable amount of time had elapsed since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that Treaty had not led to an increase in the level of stability and security. There were many reasons, the most important of which was that the text itself of the Treaty had many shortcomings and included provisions that were discriminatory in nature. The Treaty must be reviewed and revised so as to bring it more in line with the current international situation. The 1995 Review Conference and the discussions in the Preparatory Committee provided a good opportunity to consider those issues.

68. Another factor which could have a favourable impact on the work of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security was ensuring the effective participation of all States of the world in the disarmament negotiating process - both in the Conference on Disarmament, and in the work of the 1995 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee. His delegation supported the idea of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament since that would help reduce the gap between influential States and less influential States. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya called on the major Powers to renounce the policy of hegemonism and double standards, since that policy could not lead to a reduction of tension in the world.

69. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had signed six disarmament conventions, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; that demonstrated its desire to eliminate all types of weapons of mass destruction. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya believed that the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects must be implemented. In that connection, his delegation supported the statement made by the

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representative of the Red Cross. His delegation had also supported the adoption of General Assembly resolution 47/58 of 9 December 1992 on the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region and the corresponding resolutions of the non-aligned movement.

Statements in exercise of the right of reply

70. Mr. CHANDRA (India) said that, in the course of the meeting, warnings had been heard about the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and India shared that concern. Since the 1950s, India had made concrete proposals for the solution of that problem. India's nuclear programmes were for exclusively peaceful purposes. India had made comprehensive proposals for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. However, the problem of non-proliferation could be resolved effectively only at the global level, not through separate measures at the regional or bilateral levels.

71. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said that at the previous meeting, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had accused the Republic of Korea of developing nuclear weapons. Those assertions were completely groundless. His delegation wished to point out that the Republic of Korea had unilaterally renounced all forms of nuclear weapons development, and that was reflected in a special statement made by the President in December 1991 on the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Korean peninsula. The Republic of Korea was true to that policy. Moreover, since it had signed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in November 1975, it had fully complied with the provisions of that document. No one anywhere had ever expressed doubts about the transparency of nuclear installations in the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea once again urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to enter into negotiations for a rapid implementation of the joint statement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

72. Mr. HAN Tae Song (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the assertions made by the representative of the Republic of Korea were not worthy of attention.

73. Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan) requested the representative of India to explain which statements he had been referring to in his statement in exercise of the right of reply.

74. Mr. CHANDRA (India) said that he had been referring to a number of assertions made at the current meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.